Plea Bargains: Not Such a Bargain

A new study by David Abrams, recently published in the Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, casts doubt upon one of the classic assumptions of the criminal process: That plea bargains pay off for defendants.

More than 90% of all criminal cases, in CA and elsewhere, end in plea bargains rather than in a jury trial. Rather than this being an aberration, it is, as some commentators believe, a necessary mechanism to account for the cost and hassles of an impractical and unsustainable jury system.

The common understanding of the plea bargain system is that each party to the agreement gains and loses something by the bargain. The prosecution is prepared to offer a sentence that is less than what the defendant might receive from the judge in return for an expedited and less expensive resolution of the matter, leaving prosecutors with more time to devote to cases on trial. The defendant, however, gives up his/her right to trial for the certainty that s/he will not incur a “trial penalty”, that is, be sentenced more harshly by the judge if he or she is convicted.

But it turns out this may not be true.

In Is Pleading Really a Bargain?, Abrams runs regressions on a dataset from Cook County in an effort to predict which trial strategy (trial or plea bargain) yields a more lenient sentence. The results, as described in the abstract below, are surprising.

A criminal defendant’s decision of whether to accept a plea bargain is one with serious consequences both for his or her immediate and long‐term future. Conventional wisdom suggests that defendants are better served by entering into a plea bargain, to avoid what is known as the “trial penalty.” In this article I present evidence that this notion is likely mistaken. In OLS regressions using data from Cook County state courts, I find that a risk‐neutral defendant seeking to minimize his or her expected sentence would do substantially better by rejecting a plea bargain. I also employ an IV approach to the question and, while the instrument is weak, the results are consistent with the OLS: defendants are better off going to trial.

Admittedly, there are some methodological problems with Abrams’ piece. Since he’s using court data, he cannot appropriately control for self selection of cases; it may well be that defendants who chose to go to trial did so because they, or their defense attorneys, thought they had a better chance with the judge. Nonetheless, his analysis is impressive.

Abrams offers two possible explanations for his data. The first is the availability heuristic. Defendants perceive trials as being more lengthy and more harsh, because they are exposed to sensationalized trials via the media. The second is the difference in interest between defendant and defense attorney, which I expect grows when public defense offices are weighed down with caseload and slashed budgets.

I have a third possible explanation, which I believe is at least as plausible. In a world of mass incarceration and normalized, mechanical sentences with little discretion, bargaining is more like buying groceries at a supermarket than at a Middle Eastern bazaar (this analogy is Malcolm Feeley’s). In this sort of situation, the bargain price comes to manifest exactly what the prosecution expects from the court given the vast amount of evidence predicting it. The cases that go to trial are cases in which the defense believes there are enough unique features to take them out of the “normal crimes” category and make them seem special enough to the judge to warrant a downward departure from the acceptable range. And so, since so few cases go to trial, the ones that do appear special and benefit from the special attention. Some research by the late Yael Hassin, which compared actual parole committees to computers in terms of predictions of dangerousness in early releases, suggests that providing agencies with more discretion (in parole, sentencing, and the like) yields more merciful and lenient results. If so, it is not surprising that judicial attention, in a universe of otherwise mechanized sentencing, yields more lenient sentences.

Policing a Legalized World: Marijuana Growing, Searches, and Probable Cause

One of the things people often forget in debates about legalizing marijuana is that any effort at regulating a field creates interesting ambiguities. Our example-de-jour comes from the city of Arcata, where a lawsuit has been filed against the police for searching a house in which medical marijuana was grown. Here are the facts from the newspaper:

The claim — based on injuries allegedly suffered by Sage and her late husband, Charles Sage, 67 — alleges that Arcata Police officers unlawfully searched the Sages’ Zehndner Avenue home early in the morning of May 27, when Sage opened her door to an officer disguised as a utility meter reader only to have about a dozen officers enter her home with guns drawn. No marijuana was found on the premises.


While officials declined to comment specifically on Sage’s claim, they said law enforcement acts in a good faith attempt to target individuals who are in flagrant violation of Proposition 215 and Arcata’s medical marijuana ordinance. However, they noted that most violators do so under the auspices of medical marijuana and that the foggy state of California’s laws make enforcement a tricky endeavor.

Here’s the problem: Arcata’s medical marijuana growth is regulated by a land use ordinance “which allows for grows of up to 50 square feet and utilizing no more than 1,200 watts per residence.” That is, while you need a CA card to be a medical marijuana user, you don’t need one to be a grower. There is no approved list of growers anywhere, and Sage and her husband grew marijuana for Charles Sage’s prostate cancer and other ailments.

So, what was the police doing there? Well, the basis for the search warrant was marijuana smell emanating from the house. But hey – in order to obtain a search warrant, there has to be probable cause that an offense is being committed. In a post-prop-215 world, growing marijuana in itself is not an offense; growing it in violation of the ordinance is. The smell alone does not furnish probable cause that an offense is being committed.

But what is the police to do? Is home search the only way to ascertain whether there is compliance with the ordinance? If the smell of marijuana does not imply illegal activity, then something more is needed. The police could stake the house and see if there is an unusually high volume of people coming and going; conduct undercover investigations; or do something of the sort. Interestingly, in Kyllo v. United States (2000), the Supreme Court banned the usage of thermal images to scan a house for heat activity (including marijuana growth lamps). The reasoning was that it’s an invasion of one’s home. Ironically, in a post-215 world, Sage’s privacy would be less intruded upon through the usage of a thermal imager, that could tell the police whether she’s growing the allowed amount, than through a full search of the house with guns drawn. This is an interesting example of the many enforcement dilemmas the police would have to cope with had Proposition 19, which allowed home growth for personal use, passed. And it is a reminder that legalizing drugs for personal use requires careful attention to detail.

Realignment Funds: How to spend them?

This morning’s Chron has a fantastic story by Marisa Lagos about counties’ preparation for realignment. Among other things, it includes this critique from CJCJ:

Daniel Macallair, executive director of the Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice in San Francisco, said the discrepancies between counties mirror what was already happening in each jurisdiction prior to realignment. The center conducts criminal justice research and provides direct services, including a substance abuse program for adults who are released from prison.


“Most counties are not prepared to meet the challenges of realignment, and for many of them it’s their own fault. They have engaged in bad practices and policies for 30 years,” he said. “The counties that will have the hardest time are some of the Southern California and Central Valley counties that have relied heavily on the state prison system.”


Macallair said probation departments need to change the way they approach their job and rely more on the community.


“What people don’t realize is that even though we’re the state of California and we have one set of criminal laws, you have 58 counties responsible for interpreting and applying those laws and essentially 58 different criminal justice systems,” he said. “You’re going to have well functioning counties able to meet this challenge and a lot that are going to lag behind. There’s nothing uniform about this.”